T his article brings together theory of public goods provision and theory of communicative planning. The first draws heavily on the economic theory of incentives, and the second draws on Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative action and the literature on deliberative democracy. The starting point is the well known problem of free-riding, which leads on to the procedures proposed by economists for dealing with it and providing an optimal amount of public goods. The aim of the article is twofold: First, to examine whether the procedures that are economically attractive are also satisfactory from the perspective of communicative planning. Second, to learn what consequences proposals for solving the remaining efficiency problems might have for communicative planning of public goods provision. The conclusion is that recent contributions to the economic and political science literature on public goods give more room for dialogical processes.
᭤ Introduction to Communicative Planning
This article deals with the provision of public goods planned in a communicative process. The local constituency is involved in revealing the potential demand for the good and debating the physical design of the project. Interest organizations take part in the decision of how the goods should be produced and financed. Furthermore, it is assumed in this article (as in public goods theory) that an external planning authority is needed to keep free-riding in check. The funding of this agency (staffed by planners not contributing to the production of the public good) implies "budget-breaking," in the sense that more revenue must be raised than needed to produce the public good, and the planning agency lays claim to the surplus. Necessary transaction costs make up most of this surplus, but the planners may have a motive to increase the surplus beyond the minimum amount of transaction costs required to realize the public-good project. Social efficiency, on the other hand, would require the planners to reduce the surplus and distribute it in ways giving as many as possible the incentive to contribute to the public-good provision. This article shows that the most celebrated demand-revealing process providing the right amount of public goods does not protect against behavior conflicting with the values of Habermasian communicative planning. It appears, moreover, that recent proposals for solving this contrariety entail the establishment of new communicative planning bodies.
The "critical pragmatism" strand of communicative planning aims to reveal unnecessary and systematic distortions of communication and thus promote equal opportunities and build support for a reasonably effective and fair plan (Forester 
Abstract
Economic incentive theory is used to examine whether the attractive properties of Habermasian dialogue can be achieved in public goods provision. The aim is to enhance realism in the expected results of communicative planning. Hard trade-offs must be made, as manipulation and exclusion cannot be eliminated from democratic processes while other desirable qualities are retained. Demandrevealing schemes can remove citizens' motives to misrepresent their preferences for public goods and "free-ride" on others' contributions. However, the planners designing these schemes might have motives to behave opportunistically and collect too much money for administering the system. Two proposals for reducing this surplus and correcting the demotivating effects of its collection are studied. Results show that new participatory planning bodies are required to make amendment procedures work. Hence, some efficiency problems in public goods provision can be solved by expanding dialogue. This reveals a noteworthy common interest between communicative planners and economists. 1989 Sager 1994 Sager , 2006 . Habermasian dialogue is the-admittedly unattainable-ideal of the communicative planning process. All concerned should take part, freely and equally, in a cooperative search for truth, where nothing coerces anyone except the force of the better argument. According to Habermas (1999, 367) , this is . . . a speech situation that satisfies improbable conditions: openness to the public, inclusiveness, equal rights to participation, immunization against external or inherent compulsion, as well as the participants' orientation toward reaching understanding (that is, the sincere expression of utterances).
Dialogue has strong democratic properties, although it does not count votes or bow to preferences. Democratic planning means, for example, that planning proposals should not be put forward in a dictatorial manner, and that there should be no censorship on the expression of preferences. Dialogue is also truthful and sincere, so manipulation (strategic action), like stating false motives, misrevealing preferences, and setting the agenda to fit one's interests, is no part of the requested dialogue. It follows that references to "dialogue" throughout the essay associate to a communication process that is both democratic and free from manipulation. Furthermore, cycling recommendations should be avoided to make planning proposals predictable and consistent rather than arbitrary (Austen-Smith and Banks 1998) . 1 The problem is that these claims are not easily fulfilled simultaneously. The collection of decentralized information for public goods provision offers manipulators a wide range of opportunities. From this springs the common interest of economists and communicative planning theorists in searching for "strategyproof institutions," meaning rules and procedures that will not be manipulated when participants act according to selfinterest. 2 However, there is a profound conflict between the conditions for Habermasian dialogue and the self-interested utility maximization of economic models, as Avio (1999, 522) explains:
As descriptive of agents, Habermas's distinction is between homo oeconomicus and homo communicandus. The former acts to maximize given preferences, and in so doing, interacts with others to influence them by carrot or by stick; the latter acts on the basis of good reasons, reasons which are publicly defensible and consensually accessible in validity-claim dialogue with interlocutors whose intentions are formed only through the force of the better argument. Power and coercion play no role in determining the better reason.
The behavioral differences in the citation are reflected in the role of trust in Habermasian and economic models. The communicative planner must trust that participants in the process make an effort to improve mutual understanding and empathy. In the economic approach of this article, however, planners do not rely on trust that the parties behave altruistically. The emphasis here is, instead, on the construction of incentive schemes that align the self-interested behavior of agents to the goals of their principals (Miller 2001, 307) . When the schemes are successful, principals therefore need not trust their agents.
The rationality concepts associated with homo communicandus and homo oeconomicus will prove helpful in later sections. A social outcome is communicatively rational if it emanates from dialogue, as defined above. For a social outcome to be economically rational, it has to be selected in a noncycling social decision or recommendation process in which the preferences of utility-maximizing individuals are amalgamated. Economic rationality implies means-ends reasoning, as the outcome cannot be economically rational unless the means available to attain it have been used in the best possible way.
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The article is organized as follows. The next section reproduces some main results from economic incentive theory, stating that efficiency and dialogical values cannot be simultaneously obtained in public goods provision. Then follows an examination of the demand revealing scheme of VickreyClarke-Groves, which makes it possible to implement the right amount of public goods. An efficient process for providing a public good should not raise more revenue than needed to produce the good and cover minimal transaction costs. This is not generally in the interest of agencies administering the demand revealing schemes, as the planners in some agencies might be able to appropriate part of the surplus. A separate section discusses the need thus created for dialogical values in the external planning agency. This is followed by an assessment of the scope for planners to benefit indirectly from the surplus extracted from incentive schemes. A brief account is then given of recent proposals for reforming the demand revealing process. It is shown that new communicative planning bodies would facilitate the implementation of an improved process for the provision of public goods.
᭤ Public Goods Provision: Communicative Versus Instrumental Rationality
This section deals with institutions for the provision and financing of public goods. Such institutions for allocating resources cannot satisfy all the wishes concerning democracy, fairness, efficiency, and so forth, expressed by economists and planners. Communicative planners should therefore expect hard trade-offs between process qualities, similar to those identified for social decision and recommendation procedures (Sager 2002) .
The classic "free-rider" problem increased in importance with the growth of the public sector of the economy. What the single individual pays for a public good will affect the service level so slightly, that for all practical purposes the individual will not notice any difference at all. In the "economic man" model, the individual will therefore prefer that the others pay, and will try to get away with as small a disbursement as possible. This means the individual will try to be a freerider. If payment is in any way positively correlated with the utility the planner thinks each person receives from the public good, the individual has a motive for revealing false information about preferences (Taylor and Ward 1982) .
A wide range of procedures is used to allocate resources (Elster 1992) . The allocating institution selects a planning alternative (or outcome) for each configuration of actions taken by individuals, for instance, for each set of reported preference rankings. In the context of institutions allocating funds for public goods provision, preferences signal demand, so one important type of incentive scheme is the demandrevealing procedure. The institution should collect payment without distorting the demand-revealing qualities of the scheme. This financing problem can be solved but still leaves hard trade-offs to be made in communicative planning.
The central theorem representing a breakthrough in the study of allocating institutions was proved by Hurwicz (1972) . His model contained only private goods, but Ledyard and Roberts (1974) expanded the theorem to include public goods. The theorem states that with well behaved preferences 4 for public and private goods, there is no incentive compatible allocating institution which is efficient and respects individual rationality. The mechanism generating this impossibility theorem is explained by Ledyard (1987, 740) . It hinges on the fact that there is always a utility-maximizing individual who can do better by misbehaving and not taking prices as given (as one is supposed to in perfect competitive markets). Instead, utility-maximizing individuals can influence prices to their advantage by signaling false preferences, and thereby demand, in ways that no one else can detect. When an institution is "incentive compatible," individuals have no incentive to deviate from the procedures it prescribes, and no reason to misrepresent facts about which they have unique, privileged information. That is, individuals face incentives that are compatible with the social goals the institution is meant to achieve. The last two conditions in the theorem are attractive both in economics and communicative planning, as will now be explained.
The institution is efficient when it respects the Pareto criterion, which says that action should be taken if it makes at least one individual better off and nobody worse off. Should such an action exist (taking transaction costs into account), it would be inefficient not to carry it out, because we could then do better with the resources at hand. Homo oeconomicus, being a utility maximizer, would presumably agree to the implementation of such an action, so it is assumed that everyone agrees with actions leading to efficiency. Efficiency thus implies that unanimity be respected. This is a democratic requirement essential to dialogue.
An institution for allocating resources may allow the participants to remain at their initial endowments. The institution is then noncoercive in a limited sense: The amount of public goods it determines for a particular set of well behaved preferences (as defined in Note 4) must leave everyone at least as well off as they were with the initial endowments (Ledyard 1987) . Otherwise, some individual would lack the incentive to act according to the institution. Full voluntary participation in the provision process entails the possibility of falling back on the initial endowment, and this condition is here called "individual rationality." The dialogical ideal requires that all concerned freely take part in a cooperative search for solutions. The institution for providing public goods must therefore respect individual rationality if it is to be part of dialogical governance.
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Institutions that are incentive incompatible encourage strategic action (manipulation) and hence distort dialogue. With incentive compatibility, however, no individual will have reason to manipulate the planner by pretending to have a characteristic different from the true one. Participants in the resource allocation process then have a motive to follow the rules that lead to the achievement of the social goals. In effect then, the Hurwicz theorem says that any efficient and individually rational institution for providing public goods can be manipulated. This means that false preference statements because of the wish to free-ride are not easy to get rid of. Three conditions of great importance to communicative practice are juxtaposed in the Hurwicz theorem: non-manipulation, full and voluntary participation, and respect for unanimity. The theorem states that these desired conditions cannot be fulfilled simultaneously. Thus, there are contradictions between different aspects of dialogue. It is not possible to implement a communicative process for public goods provision with all the ideal features of Habermasian dialogue.
In the 1980s and 1990s much work was done to follow up Hurwicz's theorem and examine whether it is valid even for less well behaved preferences, and whether it can be generalized by relaxing assumptions about procedural qualities. Expecting to be worse off because of an incentive scheme and being reluctant to participate in the scheme are related. The theorems presented below strengthen Hurwicz's result by demonstrating the existence of dilemmas even when one of these two main elements of his theorem is left out. Saijo (1991) drops the condition of efficiency and proves that (in economies with public goods) no strategy-proof institution respecting individual rationality exists. In communicative planning and policy-making, then, one should not expect to preclude manipulation as long as one insists on the voluntary participation of every affected citizen. Several scholars have proved that a similar dilemma appears when individual rationality is obviated instead: No institution for deciding on the provision and financing of public goods can always yield efficient outcomes and at the same time be immune to manipulation (Hurwicz and Walker 1990) .
According to Beviá and Corchón (1995, 366) , the requirements to be efficient and strategy proof seem to be generally incompatible. Inefficiency implies that the means for producing public goods are not used in the best possible way, and economic rationality is thus contradicted. Furthermore, regarding truth and sincerity as essential to dialogue, it is clear that manipulation contradicts communicative rationality. The general incompatibility of being efficient and strategy proof hence points to a general tension between economic and communicative rationality in participatory policy-making that allocates resources between public goods.
When the protection against manipulation is weakened by consideration for efficiency and respect for unanimity, the planner must take into account that individuals can report a number of things from their abundance of private information, many of which may be false but undetectably so. It is possible that for some institutions considered by the planner, some participants may find that lies result in better outcomes from their points of view than truth telling. Thus the planner cannot ignore the incentive effects the institution induces. In the next section it is examined what the planner can achieve by designing clever incentive schemes. Such a scheme can be a system of fees and discounts; for example, stimulation payments offered for environmental reasons to make people dispose of old cars or studded tires.
᭤ Incentive Schemes: Do They Solve the Problems?
The previous sections argued that providing the right types of public goods on optimal scales is problematic both from an economic and communicative planning point of view. Freeriding is at the core of the matter, and the problems of public discourse and incentives for correct preference revelation are also acknowledged in the theory of economic development (Beaulier 2004, 352; Stiglitz 2001) . This section deals with some results characterizing institutions that do not give the paying participants any motive for manipulation. Drawing on insights from the Hurwicz theorem, attention is focused on the most celebrated procedure revealing the true demand for public goods.
The search is for efficient incentive schemes concerned with public goods provision that cannot be changed to the advantage of some without disadvantage to others. This is different from Arrow's (1963) intention of finding the best social outcome on the basis of individual preference rankings, that is, the particular option that maximizes the welfare of society. Designing an institution that will allow for an efficient decision about public goods is difficult, but not nearly as difficult as choosing the socially best outcome. Ickes (1986, 238) regards this as the reason for the "striking success" of the VickreyClarke-Groves scheme dealt with here. It succeeds primarily as a theoretical accomplishment, however, as its capacity for revealing correct demand in laboratory experiments has not been entirely convincing (Attiyeh, Franciosi, and Isaac 2000) . Nevertheless, this incentive scheme points to new trade-offs of interest to communicative planners.
The interesting incentive problems involve some relevant information that is unknown to the planner and impossible to acquire without costs. In the problem of designing procedures for the provision of public goods, the planner does not know the preferences of each potential contributor to the good under consideration. This makes it difficult to allocate resources to the public good in amounts reflecting future demand for it. Moreover,
[I]f my share of the project's cost is related to my stated preference, then surely I will understate my true preference, and ride free on the community. But if my share is independent of my stated preference, I can insure the project's success (if I so desire) by overstating my true desire. Can we escape this dilemma? (Ickes 1986, 237) Economists made real progress on this problem in the 1970s (Clarke 1971; Groves 1973) , although some pathbreaking ideas were put forward a decade earlier (Vickrey 1961) . Economic theory says that a consumer will purchase the socially correct quantity of a private good if the price charged is its marginal cost of production. This idea is also applied to the individual valuation of public goods (infrastructure, facilities, and services). What is priced at marginal cost in this case, however, is not access to the public good but rather influence over the existence or capacity of the good (Tideman 1997, 233) . The main insights are that individuals should be required to pay the externality caused by their own preference statement on other individuals' welfare, and that incentive constraints can be overcome with compensatory transfers. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves result says that there can be strategy-proof institutions that implement the correct amount of the public good.
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Although it was a major breakthrough, the application of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves scheme to the free-rider problem is limited by three difficulties (Moulin 1996, 47 ):
• Assumptions made about the characteristics of individual preferences are not reasonable in all situations.
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• The scheme is not budget-balanced; that is, the institution collects more money than required to produce the public good actually provided. This is inevitable, as the incentive scheme needed for efficiency in collection and provision has to be administered by an external agency that must be paid. 8 Opportunistic behavior by this actor external to production is a potential source of system inefficiency.
• A participant may end up with a payment exceeding the participant's utility from the public good, so individual rationality is not respected. (This follows from the previous point.)
The second point is important, because it has been shown that insistence on budget-balanced institutions creates situations in which the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem is valid (Roberts 1979) . This theorem says that, with at least three planning alternatives and uncensored preferences, every decision-making procedure based only on the amalgamation of individual preference rankings is either dictatorial or it can be 500 Sager manipulated. Groves and Loeb (1975) devised an incentivecompatible institution that results in the correct amount of public goods and produces a profit for the planning agency. The profit is generated by imposing losses on the other participants, however, so the scheme is not individually rational. Moreover, the strength of the incentive to reveal the truth becomes negligible as the number of participants increases. Consequently, if it costs something for individuals to discover their true preference intensity, they cannot be expected to incur this cost and announce their true willingness to pay for public goods with many potential users (Green and Laffont 1979, chap. 13) . The exposition has so far retained the requirement of strategy-proofness. That is, the search has been for demandrevealing institutions under which individuals have dominant strategies giving them the best outcome regardless of the preferences reported by other actors. We have seen, however, that this non-manipulation condition is hard to combine with efficiency. As a second best, one can search for institutions under which individuals have a stable utility-maximizing strategy once they know the preferences reported by the other actors (Nash equilibrium, which is synonymous with "stability" in this article). This property does not give the protection against manipulation provided by dominant strategies. It is still attractive though, as stability is necessary if the institution is to be self-enforcingthat is, sufficiently respected although not enforced by any external authority (in the same way as social norms and political constitutions).
Starting with the work of Groves and Ledyard (1977) , it gradually became clear that attractive possibilities are created by using the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves type of allocation-taxation institutions for public goods provision based on the above stability-inducing behavior. Among the advantages is the approximation of efficiency and thus respect for unanimity. Adding the requirement of individual rationality makes the institutions more prone to manipulation than under the stability condition alone, however (Hurwicz 1979) . So the hard trade-offs do not disappear with the introduction of stabilityinducing behavior. Communicative planners have nevertheless reason to share the economists' elation with the possibility of implementing the correct amount of public goods. Reliable demand-revealing procedures have been missed as much in land use and transport planning as in other parts of the public sector. It is a troublesome fly in the ointment, however, that the original Vickrey-Clarke-Groves scheme makes truth-telling a dominant strategy but is unable to bring about another desired aspect of public dialogue: Full participation will not be voluntary unless the outcomes reached by the institution for public goods provision are unanimously preferred to the initial endowments, which is unlikely.
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves scheme does not eliminate the possibility of inefficiency created by self-serving behavior among planners in the external agency administering the demand-revealing device. Manipulation might mean, for example, saying that more money is needed for efficient administration than is really the case. This problem is expounded and discussed in the next section.
᭤ Budget Imbalance and the Indispensability of Homo Communicandus
This section proceeds from the result developed by Holmstrom (1982) and Groves (1985) in different contexts, stating that budget balance, efficiency, and stability are mutually inconsistent.
9 Each of the concepts in this theorem has already been interpreted in preceding sections, so the result can immediately be restated in terms that are more familiar to communicative planners: No institution guiding public goods provision can guarantee respect for unanimity and full and voluntary participation while eliminating the motive for manipulation once each individual knows the preferences of others. Clearly, this is a new way of saying that the qualities requested from a dialogical planning process cannot be simultaneously obtained. The present section draws attention to the self-denial that would be required by planning agencies to the extent that they benefit from budget surplus generated by taxes levied to finance public goods. The supposition that agency planners behaving like "economic man" would be motivated to use potential surplus in self-serving ways points to a role for homo communicandus. The realism of planner opportunism in the context dealt with here is discussed in the next section.
The problem of the unbalanced budget might look like an economic technicality, but it is associated with profound economic and political difficulties. One consequence of the positive residual is that self-disciplining incentives might have to be applied to some planning agencies designing and administering allocation-taxation institutions for public goods. The reason is that those privileged to use (some of) this budget surplus for their own purposes get a stake in inefficiency, as the residual can be increased by a distortion of the demand-revealing incentive scheme. It is assumed here that some planners can benefit, although mostly indirectly, from surplus created by their efforts to design, implement, and finance programs for the production of public goods. Even without a direct relationship between the size of the residual and the funding of the agency, a larger budget surplus may raise political goodwill and thus increase the probability of improving future agency budgets. In some conditions, a generous budget can be used for supporting the planners' favorite projects or creating slack in the planning agency, making life at work more stimulating and pleasant for planning bureaucrats.
Under the assumption of "economic man" behavior, assertions by residual claimants that they will not distort the efficiency of the demand-revealing incentive scheme are not credible. Utility maximization by the planners might conflict Dialogical Values ᭣ 501
with efficiency for the local community as a whole. In other words, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves institution for solving the free-rider problem in the provision and financing of public goods upholds the opportunity for bureaucratic excess spending at the expense of the wider public. This leads to the hard task of ensuring the credible commitment of the agency planners (administering the system) to the implementation of an efficient incentive scheme that might not be in their best interest. Nevertheless, for the sake of critical analysis, it should not be assumed that planning agencies are in general so ingeniously governed that planners have lost every opportunity for creating slack in their organization. The planning agency has many ways of distorting information to make the citizens pay more and thereby increase the budget surplus. A straightforward way would be to overstate the costs of providing the public good (Nijkamp and Ubbels 1999) . This strategy makes it less likely that the project will be politically approved, however. To make up for this, the forecasts of desired impacts can also be exaggerated. This can often be done in transport planning by using unrealistically high traffic forecasts (Demery 1994; Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl 2005) . The strategy of proposing a package of projects offers possibilities of manipulating in ways that are more difficult to disclose. Initially, each of the projects is listed with a reasonable cost. Throughout the planning process, however, one or more projects are removed from the package because of allegedly unanticipated difficulties, without a corresponding reduction of the tax levied to fund the package (Langmyhr 2001) . Miller and Hammond (1994, 20) summarize the above argument:
The irony is clear: the academic search for a mechanism that would allow the center to have the information it needs to make efficient decisions has succeeded in finding these mechanisms. However, the implementation of this mechanism would require the center itself to withstand a constant temptation to lie and make inefficient decisions. This is a case of the ever-present political question of who shall guard the guardians. After successfully solving the freerider problem in financing public goods, the planning agency might develop self-serving practices against which society needs to protect itself. Allegedly faced with "constant temptation," the likelihood of the agency fostering "the plannerprince" might exceed that of nurturing "the good planner," in the words of Alexander (2001, 320): Practitioners are counseled to act in one way if they want to be good planners: practice collaborative planning including all stakeholders in a democratic process, apply sincere and truthful communication to develop a plan that represents a consensus among all affected parties. But they are advised to act quite differently if they want to be effective: engage actively in the political "game" with due attention to the realities of power, be like Machiavelli's Prince, applying Realpolitik to develop a plan and commit the relevant actors to its implementation.
The success of the residual-generating Vickrey-ClarkeGroves scheme for preference revelation depends on benevolent planners. It is not sufficient that they are neutral; humanitarian attitudes are also needed. To bring about efficient public goods provision in processes that are both fully participatory and sufficiently free from manipulation, homo communicandus is as indispensable as "economic man." As we have seen, society does not manage well with everyone being exclusively homo oeconomicus, because it causes inefficiency for the polity. This is one reason why the values of homo communicandus are attractive as part of the ideology of planners.
Obviously, the planners must think as economic actors when designing incentive schemes. They need a keen awareness of the self-serving and opportunistic behavior of everyone else. It seems to require a split personality should they stop thinking like homo oeconomicus as soon as the budget surplus starts building up, and instead set their minds on the values of homo communicandus. Paradoxically, while presupposing "economic man" behavior for other participants, economic literature has almost uniformly assumed that the planners who impose the incentive scheme and collate the resulting preference statements are in fact altruists (Miller and Hammond 1994, 16 ). Brennan and Buchanan (1985, chap. 4) criticize the methodological inconsistency of applying two different behavioral models to the same individuals. It should be assumed that individuals act according to the same behavioral principles whether their transactions take place in the public or the private sector, and whether they are planning professionals or have other occupations.
This section has argued that planners designing and administering incentive schemes can have the motive to raise more revenue than strictly required to implement the public good, thereby creating inefficiencies. However, when the link between revenue and agency budget is severed, it is not selfevident that such a motive is significant. Furthermore, even if a motive for self-serving planner behavior exists, it is not obvious that agency planners are in the position to act on it. It is conceivable that the budgetary process and the set of institutions governing the agency might in practice prevent planners from obtaining even indirect benefits from extra revenue. Then, the premise that planners have to be protected from the temptation to rent-seeking opportunism would be flawed. This potential criticism is addressed in the next section.
᭤ Planning Agencies and the Appropriation of Surplus
The preceding sections show that efficient production of public goods is problematic, that elaborate incentive schemes are required for this purpose, and that the generation of a surplus exceeding minimal transaction costs might benefit 502 Sager the agency designing and administering such a scheme. There are ways to deal with the inefficiency and inequity issues raised by surplus caused by budget-breaking in public agencies. Before outlining a couple of proposed solutions, it is, however, worth considering in what circumstances planners in some agencies would be in a position to benefit from the residual extracted from incentive schemes. The aim is to counter the anticipated criticism that the assumed possibility of planners to receive gains from incentive schemes is valid only within the formal framework of social choice theory. This issue is discussed in four steps. The first considers the motive for self-interested planner behavior in general. The second discusses whether surplus appropriated from incentive schemes can, directly or indirectly, result in bigger budgets. The third argues that many incentive schemes are administered by agencies that have planning functions. Finally, by way of two examples, the fourth step addresses the crucial question of whether planners are able to reap benefits from expanded agency budgets.
Do planners have the motive to act opportunistically?
In economics and other social research based on rational choice, it is assumed that private actors behave according to self-interest. This assumption is also often made in planning research, even by scholars outside the rational choice creed (Baum 2005) . Traditionally, there was an analytical asymmetry, in that human beings assumed to pursue self-interest in their private dealings were supposed to act altruistically in their capacity as public servants or bureaucrats. This changed with the increasing influence of the public choice school (Lane 2000, 206) . As a result, planning theorists are now well aware that there are inefficiencies in public agencies because of self-interested and opportunistic behavior.
Planners' opportunities for acting opportunistically are underlined by cases of corruption (Burley 2005; Mäntysalo 2005 ). Lalenis, Frangopoulos, and Savvidis (2006) report from Greece that 15 percent of the citizens surveyed had personal experience with corruption in urban planning departments. They add that "cases of criminal prosecutions for public employees of Greek planning departments in central and local administration, accused for corruption, are also quite frequently mentioned in the media" (2006, 1) . "Given the financial implications of planning decisions, " Campbell (2005, 518) maintains, "the specter of corruption can never be far away." In line with this, the search term "planning corruption" gives about 20,000 hits in Google. To keep opportunism in check, local governments in several countries, for instance the United Kingdom, have published guidelines on probity in planning decisions (Local Government Association 2002).
When improbity is well known in planning matters, it is all the more likely that forms of opportunism usually regarded as less reprehensible are widespread. The argument in this article does not rest on the assumption of corruption or other formal wrongdoings on the part of planners. The claim made here is much weaker; it is merely presumed that planners can be expected to strive for some slack in their agencies, and that appropriation of surplus from administering incentive schemes can help them succeed. This does not imply the violation of any laws or formal rules. In planning agencies, some extra budget money might not typically result in promotions or higher salaries. It might just as well lead to lighter work load by more use of consultants, and to the spending of a little more than strictly required on travels, professional journals, home offices, semi-social gatherings, entertainment of visiting professionals, high quality office equipment, and other perks.
Does surplus appropriated from incentive schemes result in bigger budgets?
Surely, the planners do not usually decide on the strength of the incentives, for example the level of fees. Nevertheless, fees are often set approximately as proposed by planning bureaucrats. Planners are well informed about the bureau's operation and production costs, and many fees are meant to cover the costs of carrying out particular tasks or implementing special projects. The asymmetric knowledge between planners (agents) and local politicians (principals) gives planners considerable influence on the process of price setting. Even in cases where the rates of the incentive scheme are not influenced by the planners, their way of administering the scheme might strongly affect total revenue. For example, increased patrol time by traffic wardens and more vehicle controls will bring in more money at given parking fees and given fines for driving an inadequately equipped vehicle. Moreover, the argument does not depend on revenue from incentive schemes being directly used to fund the planning agency in question. High revenue from services rendered can be used in the agency's rhetoric to demonstrate its excellence, and consensus on usefulness is likely to positively affect future agency budgets.
Observing the U.S. system, Niskanen (1994, 277) writes: "All budget measures must be approved by the legislature, . . . but the important issue is who controls the agenda of the proposals submitted to the legislature." He contends that administrators attempt to preserve their own self-interests by inflating public demands for spending, so as to secure better working conditions and perquisites for themselves. Blais and Dion (1991, 358) corroborate this conclusion and state that "bureaucrats have a substantial impact on budgetary outcomes, and that impact usually means a larger budget" (italics in original). Even scholars who dispute the budget-boosting behavior of bureaucrats concede to Dialogical Values ᭣ 503 their power to affect government budget decisions (Dolan 2002) . A bigger budget is usually in the planners' interest also when their main aim is to maximize the difference between agency revenue and the minimum cost of service production, that is, organizational slack (Wycoff 1990). Wildavsky and Caiden (2001) paint a vivid picture of the many intricate political processes, lobbyist tactics, legal and economic considerations, and bureaucratic strategies that have a bearing on public agency budgets. Obviously, the influence of the agency's officials is not strong in all cases, as resources may be allotted independently of agency performance (2001, ). Yet Wildavsky and Caiden (2001, 280) underline that "purposes and resources are interdependent" and that agencies are advocates set at convincing principals of their important purpose to augment funding. They spell out the strategies applied by agencies when submitting requests for resources. The strategy of arguing that an extra activity pays for itself and makes a profit is particularly noteworthy in the present context. A budget increase may not worry anyone if it can be shown to bring in revenue exceeding the outlays (2001, 67) .
It is unwarranted to make the same assumptions concerning slack-generating opportunities for all agencies employing planners. Some agencies perform primarily broad, coordinating tasks and are regarded as overhead costs by their political principals. Resources are usually allotted to such agencies independently of the income from their services. In other cases, for example "line" agencies such as local governments' Public Works departments, the budget might not deviate substantially from the revenue brought in by fees and charges. Some agencies are a mixture of the two types. One example is the City Planning Office in Norwegian cities, which is responsible for comprehensive and general planning of land use and transport. However, the offices also deal with division of plots and processing of private development plans, and these services are paid for by developers. The reasoning in this article fits best with the government structure of this hybrid and the line agencies, which together employ a considerable number of planners.
Do planners design and administer incentive schemes?
For the overall argument of the article to be interesting, it is essential that the administration of incentive schemes is a sufficiently significant activity in many agencies employing planners of transport, land use, and the environment. There seems to be a tendency toward more use of economic incentive schemes because of the neoliberal ideas penetrating local government in many countries.
Local authority planning departments tend to perform five main functions: (1) making of planning policy, (2) development control, (3) conservation and environmental protection, (4) enforcement, and (5) development of land owned by the local authority. Development control and environmental protection encompass several regulatory activities that might deposit surplus in the agency through the collection of charges and fees. Pennington (2000, 110) calculates that employees with regulatory functions made up about 65 to 90 percent of the staff in English planning authorities in 1991, with the lowest percentage in metro districts.
The examples below, all used in my Norwegian home town of Trondheim with a population of about 150,000, indicate the kind of incentive schemes that can be imposed.
• Fees on the handling of building permits • Fees on dividing plots and drawing maps • Fees on the processing of private development plans • Fees on refuse collection and disposal • Water and drainage charges • Parking charges • Fees for driving with studded tires in the city • Road tolls when driving into the city on working days Payment is collected for a mixture of private and public goods. For example, parking space is a private good, but a welldesigned system of parking charges helps to bring about an efficient road transport system, which is a public good. Studded tires produce fine airborne dust particles, so clean air is the public good produced by the respective incentive scheme. The toll rings around the city center collect money for building new links in the urban system of main roads, which is a public good.
Are planners in the position to draw benefits from an expanded agency budget?
Incentive schemes related to development plans and toll rings are used here to shed light on planners' possibilities to take advantage of increased revenue.
Every private planning proposal in Norway is charged when processed by the municipal planners. The fees are set locally and should cover the average costs for the municipality of handling cases under the Planning and Building Act. Nevertheless, the fees vary a lot between cities, with the payment being four times higher in Bergen than in Stavanger, for example. The differences depend in part on how much of the costs of general municipal planning is incorporated into the fees. The city planning offices to a varying degree regard these broader plans as a necessity for the handling of specific development plans. It is hard for politicians to check the real costs of the general planning that must precede the developed plans, so work that is actually charged in some cities might still be used to argue for grants from the municipal funds. To the extent that this strategy of getting paid twice succeeds, slack might be created.
The average planning costs in a city are best known to the planning department. This is particularly true for the extra costs incurred when the developer changes the plan, when 504 Sager the proposal is inadequately documented, or when express treatment is required. Thus, the planners provide essential input for the decision on fee structure. The fees paid by developers work as an incentive for not wasting the bureaucracy's time by presenting ill-prepared proposals. The public good promoted is a well-functioning city in terms of an aesthetically integrated and efficient system. The political principals treat the City Planning Office partly as an overhead cost and partly as a line agency delivering revenue-generating services. Income from the handling of development plans and division of plots makes up about one third of the office's budget in Trondheim. A budget increase depends primarily on more revenue, which means higher fees for processing plans. As improved working conditions are most likely to require bigger budgets, this gives planners the motive for proposing higher fees. Knowing that deficits can make it easier to get acceptance for increased fees, the planners might improve their situation by granting themselves a few perks, subsequently to be covered by a rise in fee levels. This strategy has to be used with considerable restraint, though, as it depends on the political superiors finding increased costs of plan processing credible. If they do not, the politicians might punish by reducing the amount of money transferred to the City Planning Office from the municipal funds.
We now turn from development plans to road tolls. Motorists must cross toll rings on their way into the largest Norwegian city centers. In Trondheim, the toll ring was removed at the end of 2005, although they are still operating in other cities, such as Oslo and Bergen. The incentive scheme (the fee structure) in Trondheim was proposed by the local County Roads Office. The municipality and the county were consulted before the tolls were accepted by the Public Roads Administration and finally sanctioned by the Norwegian parliament. The income from the toll ring was to pay for a certain package of road projects. In addition, about 20 percent of the revenue was earmarked for local public transport, environmental improvement, and facilities for bicyclists and pedestrians. The planners had much influence on incentive scheme design, as the location of toll gates, the length of the daily collection period, the groups that would have to pay, as well as the fee structure itself had to be determined so as to generate sufficient income to pay for the politically decided project portfolio. Only the road planners possessed the knowledge required to design such an incentive scheme.
Throughout the lifetime of the Trondheim toll ring (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , insufficient revenue compared to the contents of the project package was repeatedly a problem. The planners in local agencies could reap benefits from redesigns augmenting revenue and preventing the project package from falling apart. They shared this aim with their political principals, and were asked to redesign on several occasions. The advantages to the planners were of different types:
• Some projects likely to be removed from the package with insufficient revenue were considered professionally interesting by the road planners.
• Among these projects were tangential road links that would open up for environmental improvement and beautification of the city center, and these had been on the city planners' agenda for decades.
• Each project in the package provided road planners opportunities to shift to project management positions, which many civil engineers in the Norwegian Public Roads Administration see as giving higher status.
• The toll ring benefited city planners directly, as it paid for five extra planning positions in the Trondheim City Planning Office. The money was not earmarked to cover the salaries of five particular persons. Instead, any planner in the office could draw from this fund when working on tasks related to the toll ring package. This offered a convenient way of introducing some slack in the agency, as the intended area of use for the extra money was relatively wide and hard to distinguish from some of the tasks already performed by the planners.
• On a similar arrangement, revenue equal to the cost of employing nine planners was transferred from the toll ring to the local County Road Office. The extra resources were partly used for general planning tasks such as impact assessment, traffic analysis, and information about traffic and road projects to the inhabitants of Trondheim. This created some slack in the County Road Office.
This toll ring example is meant to show that planners are sometimes in the position to draw benefits from an expanded agency budget when working in an organizational setting that roughly corresponds with the model of public goods provision outlined in preceding sections. The public good provided is a local network of main roads with an environment-friendly profile. Each new road in the package is constructed by a private or publicly owned entrepreneurial firm selected in a tendering process. Its costs, that is the production costs, do not include the costs of designing the system for collecting revenue, that is, the incentive scheme. In this sense, the planners in charge of the surplus-generating toll ring are external to the production process. The budget-breaking agency is the County Road Office. Planners in this office are supposed to design the physical and economic attributes of the toll ring in a way that provides efficiency and keeps free-riding in check. In this process a surplus is created, from which the planners can gain some advantages, as shown in the bullet points above. Several redesigns of the tolling system over its fifteen years of operation ensured that revenue remained big enough to cover total expenses including production costs, necessary transaction costs, and some slack in the external planning office.
It should be clear by now that the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves demand-revealing scheme falls short of dialogical requirements. Moreover, the present section has argued that planners might sometimes benefit from the possibilities of revenue surplus, which this and other incentive schemes open for. Suggestions have been made for improving the Dialogical Values ᭣ 505 demand revealing procedure, however, and the next section examines whether they might be of interest to communicative planners.
᭤ Proposed Amendments of the Demand-Revealing Scheme
From the point of view of communicative planning, two deficiencies linger even when the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves scheme is applied. The first is the VCG scheme's discord with individual rationality. The second is the motive for opportunism that might be present in the planning agency designing and administering the demand revealing procedure. The source of both difficulties is the surplus (above production costs) that is necessarily created. By definition, budget-breaking is present when the demand revealing scheme is administered by an agency of planners who do not contribute to the production of the public good. At the turn of the century, two proposals were put forward, and taken together they allegedly solve both the above problems. One proposal aims to limit the collection of excess money, and the other aims to counteract unwanted redistribution of income. The proposals are briefly outlined below, and it is shown that both of them require the establishment of participatory bodies that invite communicative planning.
There is current debate concerning the practicality of the demand-revealing process, whether or not it can fit comfortably within the institutions of current Western-type democracies. It is, for example, desirable in many decision processes that all votes count equally, disqualifying demand-revealing information and preference intensities. Furthermore, to induce honest declaration of expected gains, the VickreyClarke-Groves scheme implies that the person who casts the deciding vote in favor of a given policy pay a tax equal to the net gain of other voters that would have resulted had the deciding voter not voted. In most contexts, this would be a radical departure from current practice, as is the case with Thompson insurance explained in the paragraphs on the Bailey-Clarke proposal below. Obviously, then, implementing an improved demand-revealing institution would create problems in addition to those that are of special interest to communicative planners. The Falaschetti-Miller proposal This is a proposal for limiting the surplus expropriated by the planning agency administering the demand-revealing scheme. The planning agency supplies efficiency-enhancing services, like the demand-revealing Vickrey-Clarke-Groves scheme, to a polity trying to supply themselves with public goods. The agency demands a share of the associated efficiency gains in return for services rendered, and might act opportunistically when doing so. However, citizens financing the public good and benefiting from it will anticipate that their own shares of the gains resulting from the planning agency's monitoring will be reduced by the planners' opportunism. Hence, an agency external to the beneficiaries of the public good may align individual demand-revealing incentives with public goals, but credible commitment against opportunistic action by the agency planners themselves may be necessary for rational individuals to subject themselves to the authority of the agency. (Compare Williamson's [1999] request for "probity" to keep transaction costs in check in parts of public bureaucracy.)
The solution suggested by Falaschetti and Miller (2001) for limiting the expropriated surplus is that the authority to design the incentive scheme and collect payment be diffused among multiple agents. These agents must then act collectively to appropriate some of the revenue contributed by the public in question. The cost for a collective to act exceeds that for a single actor, so diffusion of the external authority increases the cost for the system-administering planners to play opportunistic strategies (2001, 391) . The idea is that a rational, unitary, and self-seeking agency that has the incentive and capacity to play efficiency-retarding and opportunistic strategies, may have neither when transformed into a multifarious team.
The Bailey-Clarke proposal
This is a proposal for making the demand-revealing scheme individually rational. Bailey (1996 Bailey ( , 2001 ) and Clarke (1999) suggest that the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves scheme be combined with Thompson insurance (Thompson 1966 ). The point is to allow the members of the polity in which the public good provision is taking place, to protect themselves against losses following from redistribution of welfare. 10 In that way, individual rationality can be achieved, paving the way for full and voluntary participation in the provision of the public good. Instead of the Election Commission referred to in the citation below, one can think of the central planning agency:
Thompson proposed that the Election Commission offer fair insurance to each voter against the voter's less preferred outcome. Suppose that the outcome chosen by the government is to go ahead with the project, and that it harms the voter. Then the voter receives full compensation for this harm from the insurance, less the fair insurance premium. Those who benefit from the project, by contrast, pay the fair insurance premium to protect that benefit. Thompson demonstrated that risk-averse voters will buy full coverage for their risks, so that their purchases of insurance will tell the Election Commission their true valuations of the project. The government chooses whichever outcome requires the smaller aggregate compensation to the losers, which is the Pareto-efficient choice (Bailey 2001, 183) .
As Thompson (1966, 135) puts it: "The group decision rule is to choose that alternative for which the payoff on claims will fall short of the receipts from the collection of insurance premiums." That is, the planning agency selects the alternative that yields an expected surplus to the insurance scheme.
For the Thompson insurance to work, the planning agency administering the system must offer believably correct odds for the outcome, that is, the choice of planning alternatives. These odds are necessary to set the premiums. Hence, Clarke (1999) proposes one or several public opinion tribunals, and their agenda setting should be driven by the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves demand-revealing scheme. The tribunal considers alternative public goods projects and elicits its own willingness to pay for them. The alternative that the tribunal finds most desirable is put on the list of projects to be voted over by the political decision-makers. It is announced to the public that there will be a social choice between this alternative and the status quo (or the second best as judged by the tribunal). Each member of the constituency is then encouraged to buy insurance against the option he or she finds inferior.
The authors of the two proposals for correcting the VickreyClarke-Groves scheme do not refer to each other. Bailey (1997) mentions the "awkward budget imbalance" of the demandrevealing scheme, which causes a departure from efficiency. He shows that there are ways of distributing the surplus that do not disturb the scheme's capacity for aligning individual incentives with common goals. Falaschetti and Miller (2001) acknowledge this but maintain that the scheme-designing planners lack incentives to redistribute the surplus or drive it toward a minimum. According to them, the planning agency has a motive to maximize the surplus instead. Anyway, the problems of low incentive to vote and coalition formation (between planners and politicians, for instance) to increase the surplus and distort the efficiency of the demand-revealing process linger even after redistributing the residual revenue. Thompson insurance is meant to alleviate these problems.
The Falaschetti-Miller proposal and the Bailey-Clarke proposal both address problems of interest to planners, and in doing so, they also argue for new and collective planning bodies. The role of these bodies in communicative planning is discussed in the next section.
᭤ The Role of Communicative Planning in
Improving the Demand-Revealing Scheme Clarke (1999) and Falaschetti and Miller (2001) claim, respectively, that "strong democracy" and "a broad democratic citizenry" can improve public goods provision. Clarke asserts that experimentation with the demand-revealing scheme in limited administrative settings can promote more meaningful involvement by citizens in the "science and practice of government" (1999, 4). Communicative planning is closely connected with deliberative democracy (Elster 1998; Forester 1999) . By implication, it should be possible to design the dialogical planning process so as to improve the provision of public goods. It is sketched here how this can be done by implementing the recent proposals outlined in the previous section.
Those belonging to the scheme-designing team proposed by Falaschetti and Miller (2001) have to be external to the citizenry wanting the public good. Their task is to punish freeriding individuals, and therefore this monitoring group cannot be made up of members of the polity who provide inputs to the production process. Furthermore, Falaschetti and Miller propose to organize the multiple agents of the scheme-designing planning body as a team rather than as a hierarchy, as decisions in the hierarchy are made by command. Arguments, debate, and negotiation would then be less required, and the transaction costs of making a "collective" decision would not be high enough to deter opportunistic action. The team must therefore be a communicative planning body with enough members and conflicting interests to make it costly to build a majority coalition favoring a surplus-increasing strategy.
Assume now that the municipality is planning to build a new road. The national car drivers' associations might want to have a say in the design of the incentive scheme, as might the associations of bicyclists and pedestrians, as well as some national environmentalist organizations. The external, residualclaiming planning body could then be made up of agency planners, representatives from the relevant national interest groups just mentioned, and elected transport politicians at the county or national level. They would all have the same formal standing in the committee, and the diversity of such a collective and communicative planning body would mount significant obstacles for planners interested in pursuing surplus-seeking strategies. This increases the transaction costs of gaining support for excessive residual claims on the part of the planning agency, and the agency will therefore be more convincing when promising to forgo opportunistic actions.
In the rational choice model, the cost of collective action is the most important reason the communicative planning team cannot readily act on the incentive for efficiency-retarding increases of the surplus. However, it also helps if some members are committed to the discourse ethics manifest in the professional values of (Habermasian) communicative planning (Forester 1999, chap. 8; Habermas 1993) . It is not possible to extinguish the incentive for opportunism from a joint production system like the common provision of public goods. Nevertheless, by relocating this inducement to an extraneous communicative planning body that cannot efficiently act on the incentive for opportunism, the beneficiaries of the public good can be encouraged to contribute the necessary levels of effort and payment to sustain the optimal outcome for the polity (Falaschetti and Miller 2001, 404) .
Consider now Bailey and Clarke's proposal and the public opinion tribunals they use for estimating the odds of the various Dialogical Values ᭣ 507 public goods projects that might be chosen by the electorate. It is important that these pre-calculated odds correspond well with voting results, as that will minimize insurance payments from the public agency administering the system. The tribunal should therefore have preferences that are as similar as possible to those of the constituency. For this reason, the recommendations of the tribunal cannot be decided by one powerful member. Ideally, the tribunal should be a sample of the population of eligible voters, where the sample is either strictly random or else random conditional on stratification (proportional representation). Bailey (1996, 236 ) draws a parallel to jury selection. The decision process in the tribunal should ensure that each recommendation is an aggregation of the preferences of the members. This aggregate can emerge from deliberation and voting, simulating the democratic decision process in society at large. As already suggested, this is best achieved when the tribunal is organized as a communicative planning body. Bailey (1996, 240) states that the problems of the demandrevealing process because of income effects disappear when Thompson insurance is sufficiently accurate. This means that individual rationality is achieved by the institution combining the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves incentive scheme with Thompson insurance. A strong objection to the demand-revealing scheme from the point of view of communicative planning is then eliminated, as it no longer excludes anyone. Falaschetti and Miller (2001) correct the other deficiency important to communicative planning, namely, the incentive that some planners might have to manipulate the process of public goods provision by appropriating an unnecessarily high surplus. Such opportunism meant to generate slack in the planning agency would lead to inefficiency and the reintroduction of individual irrationality.
Hence, the two correction proposals are designed to amend different deficiencies, while they both open up for participatory and communicative planning bodies. It is not possible to use the same planning panel or committee to solve both problems addressed by the proposals. The communicative planning team diffusing the authority of the planning agency according to the Falaschetti-Miller proposal must be external. Its members cannot be representatives of those affected by the public good, as their task is to inflict punishment for freeriding. Members belonging to the public susceptible to freeriding would obviously lack the motive to punish themselves. On the other hand, the communicative planning panel serving the purpose of the Bailey-Clarke proposal must be internal. The panel works analogous to a weak legislature recommending budgetary and regulatory agendas. It should thus be a sample of those affected by the public goods.
Without Thompson insurance, the planning agency could address the constituency directly and ask citizens to reveal their demand for a planned public-good project. The result of misjudging the preferences of the electorate might be a conclusion that the project has low utility and should be cancelled. Alternatively, if the project corresponds to the preferences of the constituency and is implemented, there will be income effects that exclude some individuals in the sense that they will not voluntarily contribute to the provision of the public good.
It can be concluded that a demand-revealing process for public goods provision, which does not have characteristics running contrary to the dialogical values of communicative planning inspired by Habermas, requires the establishment of two separate participatory planning bodies. The one should be made up of representatives from the local constituency benefiting from the public goods provision. The other should be representatives from external interest organizations preoccupied with the general issues related to the public goods in question (natural environment or traffic safety, for example).
With both correction proposals implemented, there would be strong motives for putting win-win plans rather than zero sum plans on the agenda, and less administrative opportunism that might undermine such aims. In accordance with Clarke (1999, 4) , both participatory planning bodies might be "rewarded by the success with which their allocations approximate the rule of unanimity in the public economy." Furthermore, the introduction of an insurance scheme aimed at protecting the interests of everyone affected by the prospective public good would bring about a situation with few losers, if any. At least in theory then, the amended demand-revealing process ensuring efficiency in public goods provision would come close to attaining the consensus goal of collaborative planning Innes and Boheer 1999) .
᭤ Conclusion
Incentive schemes for optimal public goods provision are intended to create social efficiency gains. However, those who design and administer such schemes can opportunistically manipulate them to obtain a share of these gains. Institutional constraints limit the scope that planners acting in these roles have for such manipulation, but (as shown above) they do not make it impossible. Nor can we ignore this problem on the (mistaken) assumption that planners always act ethically.
This article has shown that the conflict between process qualities in public goods provision is resolved neither by accepting some scope for manipulation (stability or Nash equilibrium) nor by introducing an incentive scheme for revealing correct preferences for public goods (the Vickrey-ClarkeGroves scheme). Amendments to this scheme are required, and the Falaschetti-Miller and Bailey-Clarke proposals might provide an optimal amount of public goods in a participatory and communicative process, although this remains to be confirmed in practice.
As stressed by Eswaran and Kotwal (1984) and Falaschetti and Miller (2001) , the motive for playing opportunistic strategies cannot be completely eradicated from a system of 508 Sager self-interested agents. At some point in every organization, self-interest is at war with efficiency. Much can be done in system design, however, to increase the costs of pursuing strategies that detract from system achievement-as shown in this essay. Moreover, professional ethics breaking with the utility-maximizing behavior of "economic man" helps to combine democracy, truth, and efficiency in the provision of public goods. This presents an opportunity to homo communicandus and underlines the importance of dialogical values embedded in communicative planning. Some conclusions with implications for communicative planning theory are listed below:
• Incentive theory shows that economists and communicative planning theorists share some worries concerning institutions for public goods provision: The conditions of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and individual rationality cannot be satisfied simultaneously, but are nevertheless necessary both for a well-working economic system and for dialogue and thus deliberative democracy.
• The most widely discussed incentive scheme for revealing the correct demand for public goods is not satisfactory from the perspective of communicative planning. Scheme designs that do not motivate citizens to reveal manipulatory preference statements might motivate planner manipulation (to increase budget surplus) instead. The obstacle to efficiency in otherwise sound public good provision is the self-interest of planning officials who might be in the position to generate larger net revenues with less efficient schemes.
• Planners with altruistic behavior approaching that of homo communicandus can help to ensure that incentive schemes for providing the correct amount of public goods are not perverted.
• The process-revealing demand for public goods can be brought in line with the values of (Habermasian) communicative planning by introducing new participatory planning bodies. Their purpose is to limit the surplus appropriated by the planning agency and to facilitate compensation for loss of income or welfare, thereby encouraging participation in the provision of public goods.
The analysis has shown that there are logical constraints on the simultaneous realization of the various features considered attractive in communicative planning. The conclusions above help to form realistic expectations of what can be achieved by striving for (Habermasian) dialogue in the process of public goods provision. Communicative planning may, for example, do a better job in improving the formation and articulation of preferences, as opposed to eliciting accurate representation of preferences, a task that might be better handled by incentive theory. The essay should not be read as a critique of communicative planning as such, though. On the contrary, it is argued that communicative planning bodies can help to produce public goods in a democratic and efficient manner. It is also maintained that the resolution of important planning problems is facilitated by planners willing to approach dialogue and involve themselves in planning processes based on empathy and altruism.
Communicative planning is much about making the planning process inclusive, democratic, and dialogical. It is quite commonly assumed that such open and participatory processes are cumbersome and overly time-consuming; in other words, they detract from efficiency. Economists and communicative planners are therefore often thought to emphasize incompatible aspects of the planning and policymaking process. It is remarkable, therefore, that economists have reached the conclusion that participatory and communicative planning bodies are required to ensure efficiency in public goods provision. Although planners have argued for such bodies to approach communicative rationality, it turns out that they are also needed to achieve economic rationality. The dialogical process affects the substantive outcome by influencing the willingness of citizens to correctly reveal future demand for the public good. This points to someperhaps rather unexpected-common ground between planning theory and economic incentive theory. ᭤ Notes 1. Non-cycling (transitivity, consistency) means that X is ranked above Z when alternative X is ranked higher than alternative Y, and Y is ranked higher than Z.
Author
2. An "institution" is here a humanly devised constraint that shapes human interaction (a voting rule, decision procedure, etc.) (Calvert 1995) . A decision procedure or demand-revealing scheme is strategy-proof when each participant will tell the truth no matter what information is revealed by others, that is, when truthfulness is a dominant strategy (Barberà 2001) . In Bureaucracy and Representative Government from 1971, William Niskanen presented an influential and controversial theory of the bureau's budget and output when bureaucrats act according to self-interest (Niskanen 1994) .
3. An efficient decision rule or institution respects the Pareto principle. That is, the procedure leads to a situation from which the utility of one individual cannot be increased without decreasing the utility of someone else.
4. Well behaved preferences (as in "economic environments") are continuous, convex, and monotonic. Should the individual preferences be discontinuous, the information needed would be disturbing, as precise knowledge of individuals' strategies is needed to compute an optimal social strategy. Knowledge of individual strategies is still needed with continuous preferences, but continuity means that a small error in predicting an agent's strategy will result in a small error in the social outcome (Postlewaite 1985, 224) . When individuals have a convex preference ordering and an ordinary budget constraint, their self-interested choice of alternative will give them the best possible outcome, and this is of considerable value when analyzing participants' responses to changes in Dialogical Values ᭣ 509 choice opportunities. Convexity is a generalization of the assumption of diminishing marginal rates of substitution (Varian 1992, 96-97) . Monotonicity is a condition on the social choice procedure. It rules out interpersonal comparisons and amounts to something very close to independence of irrelevant alternatives (Maskin 1985, 178) . Monotonicity means that if every individual's decision concerning an alternative a remains unchanged or changes in favor of a, and every individual's decision concerning any other alternative is unchanged, then the social decision concerning a also remains unchanged or changes in favor of a. It is noteworthy from the perspective of communicative planning that Hurwicz's (1972, 330) original formulation of the theorem required the institution to be "Pareto-satisfactory, privacyrespecting" instead of efficient to obtain the impossibility result. Respect for privacy means informational decentralization in this context, implying that no participant, including the planning agency, has any direct knowledge of others' preferences, endowments, and technologies (except that preferences are well behaved). It is implicitly assumed that communication is limited so as not to nullify privacy. This makes it possible for participants to manipulate by acting as if their endowments or preferences were different from what they really are, provided that the participants' observable behavior still appears rational to other participants (1972, 326) .
5. Saijo and Yamato (1999) note that most allocation schemes share the property that participants do not have the freedom to decline participation. The mutual respect for basic values necessary in communicative planning makes it important that individuals can refuse to participate in some public projects and policies. For instance, in countries with a state religionsuch as Norway-individuals with deviating religious beliefs should not have to contribute to the funding of the Norwegian State Church (and they do not have to). Saijo and Yamato show that efficient allocations are not achieved when participation is voluntary (1999, 229) . Dixit and Olson (2000) demonstrate that the combination of voluntary participation and efficiency in public goods provision is problematic also in a dynamic analysis, even when transaction costs are very small.
6. Imagine a public-good project with costs that can be continuously reduced or increased with varying project size and quality. The formula for computing the individual taxes financing the project consists of three components. The first two form the difference between the project's cost and everyone else's benefit. When individuals must pay this difference, they do not stand to gain from misrepresenting their preferences. This is because the cost of the project varies with the same amount as their stated benefit. If they overstate their benefit, the cost of the project is increased. But it will not affect what other individuals report, so it will increase the tax by the amount it increases costs. Individuals who overstate their benefits will pay more for the project than they believe it is worth to them. Understating their benefit decreases their tax by the amount it decreases the cost, but their expected benefit is reduced as much as the cost. The third component is unrelated to the benefit reported by the individual. It is a lump sum serving to raise revenue for the project. Clarke (1980 Clarke ( /2000 and Miller and Hammond (1994) show by easy-to-follow examples how the incentive scheme works, and Tideman (1997) offers a lucid theoretical explanation. Clarke's textbook example is also available on http://clarke.pair .com/examples.html. Dolan (1978) and Brough, Clarke, and Tideman (1994) apply the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves scheme to queuing and congestion problems, whereas Falkinger, Hackl, and Pruckner (1996) apply a similar scheme for dealing with the global warming emissions problem.
7. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves scheme works only if individual utility increases linearly with the money transfers received, and if the preferences are separable. Separability induces well-defined marginal utility over each dimension of the collective choice problem. With road building and public expenditure on education as two dimensions of local politics, separability means that preferences over road building are independent of the spending on education, and conversely. Separability should not be assumed for public goods that compete for money from the same budget, for example, as road projects in the same network.
8. I have chosen to follow the terminology of Miller and Hammond (1994) and Falaschetti and Miller (2001) and hence apply the notion of budget-breaking. Alternatively, I could have made more use of the transaction cost concept (Williamson 1999) . Payment to the planning agency for providing and administering an efficient incentive scheme would be part of transaction costs. The change of terminology would of course not affect the reality that the alternative conceptual models seek to explain, so planners would still have a motive for acting opportunistically and creating slack in their organizations.
9. In the context of Groves (1985) , a balanced budget implies a cost allocation scheme that divides the total costs fully among the users of the public good. Holmstrom (1982) studies a group of individuals organized so that their productive inputs are related. By budget balance, he means that the full monetary outcome resulting from their productive efforts is divided among them and nobody else. Breaking the budget means that the benefits are distributed among a larger set of people than those whose actions determine the size of those benefits. The purpose of relaxing the budget-balancing constraint in Holmstrom's setting is to permit group penalties that are sufficient to police all agents' behavior, thus making them act efficiently. Eswaran and Kotwal (1984) point out that even the third party introduced to inflict punishment has a motive for opportunism. Miller (2001, 310-11 ) offers a simple explanation of Holmstrom's theorem.
10. Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is often used to assess the social desirability of proposed public goods projects. The normal situation is that there are both winners and losers. The CBA allows for this by applying the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, stating that the public good should be provided when the beneficiaries are hypothetically able to compensate the losers and still be left with a net benefit. The Bailey-Clarke proposal would guarantee that compensations are not merely hypothetical. Sager
